Independent Agencies example #87684

Independent Agencies are outside of the executive branch and are not under the supervision of the president. They were in most cases created by Congress to deal with matters that have become too complex for the scope of ordinary legislation.

The head of most independent agencies is a commission/ collegial (means a multimember head) rather than a 1 person head of the executive agency. The term of service of the head of the independent agency is staggered- this means it overlaps with that of the Presidential term.

Heads are only often removable only for cause as noted in Humphrey's executor. Congress has limited the removal powers of the president over these officials. The single individual head of most executive agency serves at the discretion of the president and can be removed for cause.

Independent Agencies- as noted in Humphrey's executor perform both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative function. The independent agencies regulations have the power of federal law in the US.

The independent agencies are essentially created by Congress who issues the enabling statutes.

First, Congress is virtually delegating executive functions which is in the purview of the executive branch almost like a Browshar issue. Second the regulations made by these enabling statutes have the full effect of the law w/out the benefit of presentment.

Most importantly the independent agencies perform quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial function-powers of 2 branches concentrated in 1 agency. This is a potential violation of separation of powers in the form of encroachment, a threat to dual branch law-making. The aim of separation of powers was to avoid concentration of powers in 1 branch, a situation that could lead to improvident laws and regulations being imposed on the people without the checks of another branch

Humphrey's Executor (1935) was the pivotal case that led to modern notion of independent agencies. This case stated that limitations could be placed on the President's ability to remove officers in an independent regulatory agency. They found constitutional backing for limiting removal of officers to situations where they would be removed "with cause."

Because it limited the president's ability to remove officers of agencies who exercised quasi-judicial or legislative powers, which again would run counter to the separation of powers doctrine. Those agencies are important in the matters that they regulate, so it is important for them to be insulted from political pressure, especially from the president

The term of service of the head of the independent agency is staggered- this means it overlaps with that of the Presidential term. Heads are only often removable only for cause as noted in Weiner & Humphrey's executor. Congress has limited the removal powers of the president over these officials. The single individual head of most executive agency serves at the discretion of the president and can be removed for cause.

An agency is headed by multi-members groups, rather than a single agency head in which no more than a simple majority of the members may comes from one political party, whose members serve for fixed, staggered terms, and who can only be removed for cause. To ensure a more even-handed approach politically, so that one ideological belief does not dominate the agency for an extended period of time

The President appoints the commissioners or board members, subject to Senate confirmation, but they often serve with staggered terms, and often for longer terms than a usual four-year Presidential term, meaning most Presidents will not have the opportunity to appoint all the commissioners of a given independent agency. Because there are certain restrictions to the appointment process when it comes to independent agencies. Because they serve in staggered terms, and only a simple majority of one political ideology can sit for the board, a two term president may be able to shape the board in a way that prevents the next president from appointing a member of his political party for some time

Examples of Independent Agencies are the ICC, FCC, NLRB, and NRC. The National Labor Relations Board, the FEC, the FTC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the FCC.

Technically they are in the executive branch. However they are insulated from to an extent from control from the President. Though insulated from presidential control, most independent agencies serve the executive function of enforcing laws.

Independent Agencies are generally controlled by a committee or board with staggered terms of office. This slows down the President's ability to control them by just firing the agency head. Cabinet level agencies, on the other hand, have one agency head, who serves at the will of the president (Attorney General) because they are executive agencies.

Independence comes from this limited nature of presidential control

The president has no control over regulations and adjudications of an independent board, the independent board does not have to deal with OMB or OIRA oversight, and the president can only remove IB members for cause. The president also has certain restrictions on who he can appoint to independent agencies when it comes to political ideology

To insulate their decision making process from the desires of an ever-changing political landscape. To ensure that certain important regulatory entities are insulated from political pressure.

To insulate their decision making process from the desires of an ever-changing political landscape. To ensure that certain important regulatory entities are insulated from political pressure.

Independent agencies combine powers resembling those of the three separate branches and are somewhat insulated from presidential control. Humphrey's Executor held that Congress could circumscribe the President's power to remove members of independent regulatory agencies.

Unlike with other agencies, Presidential power is limited in removal of officials in independent regulatory agencies. This challenges notions of separations of powers because the legislature is limiting a typical executive power. Through the appointments clause the executive branch usually has the power to appoint and remove agency officials. The Court in Humphrey stated that the legislature could place limits on executive removal powers. They could disallow the executive branch to remove an official without cause.

There is little control that the other three branches have over the powers that the independent agencies have, with the only real power being appointment and confirmation power of the president and the senate. This would disturb the founders because they were worried about accountability to the people.

Some have described federal agencies as making up a fourth branch of government because so many of those agencies combine powers resembling those separately associated with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This fourth branch has been called "headless" to imply agencies are not subject to any central control..

(1) agencies do not literally exercise the powers of the three separate branches. In particular, although many agencies have the power to make rules that have a legal effect similar to that of legislation, an agency's rulemaking power, unlike congress' legislative power, comes from statute and not from the constitution. Most agencies are also subject to judicial review. For these reasons, agency's rulemaking powers are only "quasi-legislative." (2) Secondly, independent agencies are not beyond the control of officials in the three branches. Most independent agencies are considered part of the executive branch.

(1) The aim of separation of powers was to avoid concentration of powers in 1 branch, a situation that could lead to improvident laws and regulations being imposed on the people without the checks of another branch. (2) To prevent one branch from becoming supreme, protect the "opulent minority" from the majority, and to induce the branches to cooperate, government systems that employ a separation of powers need a way to balance each of the branches. Typically this was accomplished through a system of "checks and balances", the origin of which, like separation of powers itself, is specifically credited to Montesquieu. Checks and balances allow for a system based regulation that allows one branch to limit another, such as the power of Congress to alter the composition and jurisdiction of the federal courts.